Sudan: Gold and Mercenaries – the Price of the Massacre in Sudan

On October 26, 2025, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia took the city of El Fasher after an 18-month siege. The capital of North Darfur State and the economic heart of Darfur, El Fasher had served as a refuge for hundreds of thousands of displaced people fleeing the fighting since April 2023. It was the last humanitarian access point for the UN until its fall. Under siege, the information reaching us consists mainly of videos of abuses filmed by the RSF militiamen themselves. Testimonies are beginning to emerge, reporting mass ethnic crimes against black populations by Arab militias.

The open conflict began on April 15, 2023, when the paramilitary RSF clashed with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) for political and military control of the country. The RSF is led by Mohamed Hamdan Dogolo, known as “Hemedti,” while the SAF answer to Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and form the regular army. The two generals were allies for a time and were supposed to share power, but the breakup now raises fears of an east-west partition of Sudan.

Hemedti is originally from Darfur. Initially known as a “businessman,” he built an empire thanks to the gold mines in his native region. As an Arab, he rallied the Janjaweed, who were then armed by Omar al-Bashir to quell the rebellion in Darfur. From 2004 onwards, Hemedti led several hundred Janjaweed fighters and collaborated directly with the Sudanese intelligence services (the NISS) and the army. The Janjaweed are guilty of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide according to the ICC, documented by the UN as mass murders, rape as a weapon of war, systematic destruction of villages, looting of property and livestock, burning of crops, poisoning of wells, and forced displacement.

In 2009, Hemedti created Al Junaid for gold mining in Darfur. But in 2013, under international pressure, the Sudanese government wanted to integrate the Janjaweed into the country’s security architecture. They became the famous RSF, with Al Junaid as their economic arm.

In April 2019, Sudan entered a decisive phase in its history. After several months of popular protests triggered by soaring prices and economic crisis, the unrest took a political turn and openly called for the departure of President Omar al-Bashir, who had been in power for 30 years. Faced with pressure from the streets and internal divisions within the regime, the army finally ousted al-Bashir on April 11, 2019. This overthrow ushered in a period of uncertainty: a Transitional Military Council initially took power, before a fragile compromise was reached with the civilian forces of the revolutionary movement. It was in this context that General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan became president of the Sovereign Council, while Hemedti became its vice-president. This alliance between the army, the paramilitaries, and some of the civilians was supposed to pave the way for democratic elections, but it quickly proved unstable: the competing ambitions of military leaders, the impunity of the RSF, and the difficulties faced by civilian institutions plunged the country back into a power struggle that would erupt into open war in 2023.

But external players must also be considered. Darfur’s strategic position and mineral wealth have placed it at the crossroads of trafficking routes, with Hemedti at its centre.

The Russian connection

Following the capture of Jebel Amer (North Darfur) in 2017, a mountainous area extremely rich in gold, the RSF gained real autonomy from Omar al-Bashir. This victory coincided with significant support from the late Evgeni Prigozhin, then leader of the Russian SMP Wagner. This can be explained by the type of business in which the two men are involved (gold, weapons, mercenaries) and the geographical position of Hemedti’s stronghold, Darfur. Darfur borders the Central African Republic (CAR), Wagner’s strongest bastion, which has been the praetorian guard of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra since 2017. According to its usual pattern, Wagner pays itself in mineral resources from the country. Convoys travel between the CAR and Sudan via Darfur.

In the same year, 2017, Wagner spun its web in Omar al-Bashir’s Sudan. The intermediary is Mikhail Potepkin. He heads Meroe Gold, a subsidiary of M Invest, which belongs to Prigozhin. Potepkin claims to have no connection with Prigozhin, but in 2017 he represented M Invest at a meeting between Dmitry Medvedev and Omar al-Bashir. Potepkine is said to belong to Russian “conservative” groups linked to the neo-Nazi far right. He is familiar with the ideologue Dugin, with whom he appears in photographs. He also appears in the Russian interference operation in the 2016 US elections. In Africa, as in the United States, he plays the role of a lobbyist whose job is to destabilize. Sudan and Ethiopia are among the priority countries. Since 2017, Meroe Gold has received substantial support from companies linked to Prigozhin, in terms of financing and equipment, including helicopters and aircraft. Meroe’s core business is gold mining, and its nerve centre, al-Ibaidiya, is located in Nile River State in the east of the country. Russian planes then took off from Khartoum or Port Sudan bound for Russia to finance the preparation of the invasion of Ukraine and then the war effort. On February 24, 2022, the very day that Russian troops invaded Ukraine, Hemedti was in Moscow during a trip organized by Wagner. A territorial complementarity in gold mining in Sudan (Hemedti in the east, Prigozhin in the west) had been established on the eve of Hemedti’s coup in April 2023 against al-Burhan, with whom he had shared power since 2019, after the fall of al-Bashir.

But on August 23, 2023, Evgeni Prigozhin died in a plane crash. The Kremlin then largely took over Wagner’s activities and turned away from Hemedti in favour of al-Burhan.

The UAE backer

However, one source of support that has remained unwavering is that provided by the United Arab Emirates to Hemedti and the RSF.

Al Junaid’s gold is sent directly to Dubai, more precisely to Sharjah, to the Kaloti refinery, a group founded in 1988 by Munir Ragheb Mousa Al Kaloti and comprising a dozen companies all linked to precious metals. Artisanal gold and gold from trafficking is also collected at the Dubai souk and taken to Kaloti’s offices. Regulation is very lax in Dubai and it is perfectly legal to carry raw gold in one’s hand luggage, without any additional taxes. The gold centralized by Kaloti is then shipped to Switzerland, mainly to Valcambi.

This small country in Central Europe is the hub of the global gold trade, refining and trading. But going through Valcambi is not just a matter of commercial and logistical opportunity. The Ticino-based company is registered with the London Bullion Market Association. It can therefore certify this gold, which then enters the very official circuit of central banks around the world. This is not the case with Kaloti, far from it.

In exchange, the Emirates flood the RSF with weapons, equipment, and mercenaries. For several years, it was African countries that supplied fighters to the Emirates to go to Yemen in their coalition against the Houthis, but today, the tide has turned.

In fact, multi-million-dollar contracts were signed through the firm Dickens & Madsen for the exchange of fighters between Marshal Haftar’s Libya, Hemedti’s RSF, and the United Arab Emirates in exchange for weapons and Russian agricultural commodities. Again we are seeing the overlap between Russian and Emirati networks.

Until 2021, the Assab base served as a hub for these exchanges, but since the UAE’s withdrawal from the Eritrean port and the sudden and brutal break between the Eritrean president and the Ethiopian prime minister, who is himself very close to Abu Dhabi, the ports of Somaliland and Puntland have taken over. As documented by Middle East Eye, the port of Bosaso is said to serve as a logistics hub between the Emirates and the RSF. Colombian mercenaries are alleged to have been supplied by the UAE to the RSF and to have contributed to the capture of El Fasher. These mercenaries are said to have been seen training child soldiers in refugee camps in Darfur.

In Sudan, as in neighbouring Tigray, the thirst for gold has precipitated disaster and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Other minerals are fuelling greed, and populations will be plunged into the abyss. It is becoming more than urgent to establish binding international regulations on mining and to impose full traceability.

There were first blood diamonds, and now it is gold – whose price has skyrocketed – that is tainted. But unlike diamonds, gold is fusible and therefore more difficult to trace, although it is not impossible, and Switzerland and the UAE would honour their international reputation by clarifying their suppliers.

By African Arguments