Ghana: Will Ghana’s Mahama Grasp the Nettle of Constitutional Reform?

Ghana’s constitution allows an excessively powerful presidency to influence all levels of administration – it must be reformed.

John Mahama won nearly 57% of the votes in Ghana’s December 2024 presidential elections. His National Democratic Congress (NDC) secured about two-thirds of the 276 seats in Parliament. Mahama was previously the country’s president from 2012-17.

The early concession by Mahama’s main opponent, then vice-president Mahamudu Bawumia of the New Patriotic Party, and the peaceful transfer of power on 7 January, solidified Ghana’s reputation as one of Africa’s most stable democracies.

Mahama’s strong electoral mandate presents an opportunity for governance reforms that have eluded the country since its return to constitutional democracy in 1992. It also aligns with his campaign promise to ‘reset’ Ghana.

Reform is key to rebuilding flagging public trust in the country’s governance institutions. Between 2012 and 2024, public satisfaction with democracy in Ghana declined by 23%, and support for military rule more than doubled from 14% to 32%.

Ghana’s Ibrahim Index of African Governance score has stagnated since 2014, with declines in security and rule of law tallies. This disenchantment is evident in the public mistrust of the judiciary, law enforcement and the electoral management body.

Underpinning this situation are structural weaknesses created by Ghana’s constitution. While it provides for a hybrid presidential-parliamentary system and a separation of powers, it inadvertently undermines this separation by creating an excessively powerful executive presidency.

Several provisions make the presidency immensely influential over all governance institutions. The power to make thousands of appointments places occupants of key government positions at the presidency’s disposal.

Under Article 78, the president appoints most government ministers from Parliament. With ministers doubling as parliamentary representatives, Parliament has become susceptible to executive influence, undermining its ability to hold the executive to account.

The judiciary is also not immune to executive influence. Appointing the Chief Justice and other Superior Court judges requires a simple parliamentary majority, which the president’s party typically holds. Importantly, the constitution doesn’t stipulate the number of judges in the Superior Court, allowing the president to appoint as many as deemed necessary.

This led to Mahama and the NDC accusing former president Nana Akufo-Addo of judicial manipulation before last year’s elections.

The constitution also makes it difficult for the security services to assert their independence. The president can appoint or remove the Inspector General of Police and most of the Police Council – the body that advises on policy, senior promotions, and administrative and budgetary issues. As a result, opposition parties distrust the police, who they say serve the government’s interests.

Even the independent Electoral Commission of Ghana is not beyond the executive’s reach. Article 70 empowers the president to appoint the commission head, deputies and other members without parliamentary approval.

In 2018, Akufo-Addo dismissed then chairperson Charlotte Osei – appointed by Mahama during his first term – and her two deputies on the recommendation of a committee established by the Chief Justice. On 27 January, Mahama was petitioned to remove chairperson Jean Mensa and other electoral commission officials appointed by Akufo-Addo.

At the local level, Article 243(1) allows the president to appoint all metropolitan, municipal and district chief executives who are heads of local governments. Article 242(d) allows the president to appoint 30% of all local assemblies. These powers, and the flow of most local government revenue through the central government, make local authorities largely accountable to the presidency, not their communities.

Presidential appointments also permeate the civil service and parastatal institutions. Over 4 000 positions are reportedly directly filled by presidential appointments. A change of government from one party to another usually leads not only to mass firings, but also to revocation of appointments made in the immediate pre- and post-election periods.

An example is the controversial recent directive by Mahama’s chief of staff to all government institutions revoking all public service appointments after the December 2024 elections.

Successive governments have recognised these weaknesses and set up constitutional review committees to address them. Already, Mahama has created a committee to, among other things, review past committees’ recommendations and suggest possible amendments.

Since the NDC has promised to reset the country, the time is ripe to confront the constitutional provisions that impede building strong institutions free of political interference. Meaningful reform should include either reducing the number of presidential appointments or subjecting them to an inclusive process with minimal executive influence.

The Chief Justice could be appointed by the president from four senior judges shortlisted by the Judicial Council and approved by a two-thirds parliamentary majority. This would favour merit over political considerations in selection. A similar procedure could be used for Supreme Court judges. And the number of High Court judges, especially in the Supreme Court, should be capped.

Regarding appointments in other sectors, electoral commission leaders should be appointed by a two-thirds majority in Parliament, and people with known political party affiliations should be excluded from applying. The Inspector General of Police should be appointed for a fixed term with security of tenure, and the Police Council made independent of the presidency.

To enhance Parliament’s watchdog role, Article 78 should be amended to separate the executive and legislative branches. Finally, amending Articles 55(3) and 243(1) would facilitate the election of metropolitan, municipal and district chief executives, and ensure political party participation at local government level.

With their considerable public goodwill, Mahama and the NDC could transform governance in Ghana. Previous efforts were derailed by inter-party disagreement and sometimes a lack of public support.

However, as the 2011 Constitution Review Commission’s report shows, there is strong public support for most of the amendments discussed above. And besides Article 55(3), provisions are largely non-entrenched, and their revision would require the NDC’s two-thirds parliamentary majority vote.

Mahama’s establishment of the review committee is a positive sign. But whether his administration introduces substantial reform and resists the temptation to pack governance institutions with party sympathisers, remains to be seen.

By ISS.