South Africa: SA Local Elections Will Test Voters’ Ability to Spot Fake News

Public confidence in identifying disinformation is falling just as AI and hyper-local campaigning make election manipulation harder to detect.

South Africa’s new code of conduct against election disinformation is a vital step ahead of what could be the country’s most fiercely contested local polls on 4 November.

The Electoral Code of Conduct Countering Disinformation in the Local Government Elections (Disinformation Code) was gazetted by the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) on 4 September. These legal provisions are badly needed, considering that citizens are becoming less confident in their ability to identify fake news.

According to the IEC’s latest Voter Participation Survey, the proportion of respondents who describe themselves as confident in recognising fake news declined from 62% in 2023 to 52% in 2025/26. Yet only 18% say they regularly verify election-related information before liking, sharing or reposting it.

As the polls approach, the survey shows that traditional media remains highly influential, with 71% of respondents relying on television and 38% on radio for voting information. At the same time, social media is gaining ground – 23% cite it as a source of election-related information, up from 8% in 2021.

While social media may not be a leading source of election information, South Africans spend a lot of time online. In 2025, an average of nine hours and 37 minutes online daily was recorded – the highest in the world. Roughly three and a half of those hours were on social media. But greater access to information has not translated into stronger verification practices.

The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2026 ranks misinformation and disinformation among the top risks facing societies. Speaking at the Disinformation Dialogue 2026, IEC Chairperson Mosotho Moepya warned that the 2026 elections would likely see a shift from national misinformation and disinformation to ‘ward-specific deceptions’ driven by generative artificial intelligence (AI) and hyper-local campaigning.

Moepya’s concerns align with Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research showing that disinformation and political messaging are becoming increasingly localised and targeted at specific communities and voter groups. Community WhatsApp groups and Facebook pages have become central arenas for political discussion at the ward and municipal levels. In these spaces, information travels quickly, and verification is often limited.

At the same time, political parties are investing more in digital campaigning. ISS research shows that online political advertising and influencer-driven campaigning are becoming increasingly important features of election strategies.

While these tools can enhance political engagement, they can also make it harder for voters to distinguish between authentic political discussion, sponsored content and coordinated influence campaigns. AI is further complicating the picture. South Africa has not yet experienced a major election crisis linked to deepfakes, but AI-generated content is becoming cheaper, more accessible and harder to detect.

As a result, information integrity will no longer be simply a media issue, but an integral part of citizenship, democracy and governance.

Technology is not inherently the problem. It can be used both to spread harmful falsehoods and to help voters access accurate information. South Africa’s challenge is to ensure that the tools designed to strengthen democratic participation evolve as quickly as the technologies used to manipulate it.

Much of the public conversation around disinformation focuses on social media users. However, verification cannot be the sole responsibility of citizens. Professional and legacy media journalists remain one of democracy’s most important lines of defence against false and misleading information. They investigate claims, provide context and test competing narratives before they reach the public.

Although newsrooms are increasingly pressured to produce more content with fewer resources, this does not necessarily mean that verification standards are being compromised. Newzroom Afrika told ISS Today that accuracy takes precedence over being first. It applies the three-step verification process and labels fabricated AI-generated content as fake. These standard practices are reflected in the Press Council of South Africa’s guidance on the use of AI in journalism.

This year, the IEC has expanded its efforts to strengthen information integrity and public trust. Voter education campaigns and public roadshows have been accompanied by journalist training, digital outreach and new tools enabling voters to verify information through official channels.

The new Disinformation Code requires political parties and candidates to verify information before sharing it and to clearly label political advertising and AI-generated or synthetic content. They must also correct and retract false or misleading information within 36 hours. Anyone can report suspected election-related online disinformation through the IEC’s Real411 platform.

Crucially, the Disinformation Code extends responsibility for information integrity beyond official party statements to the wider networks through which political content circulates.

Social media platforms also have a role to play. As political parties and candidates face greater expectations to take responsibility for the information they share, platforms should strengthen their responses to election-related disinformation. The IEC chairperson warns that breaches of the Disinformation Code carry the same legal consequences as violations of the core Electoral Code of Conduct.

While the Disinformation Code remains in force only until the election results are declared, the problem can persist long afterwards, as allegations of vote rigging after the 2024 elections demonstrated. South Africa will therefore need long-term information integrity solutions that extend beyond elections.

Safeguarding local democracy is a shared responsibility, but citizens are an important first line of defence. Small, deliberate actions – such as challenging a suspicious post in a community WhatsApp group or helping a family member verify a candidate’s claim – can strengthen democratic resilience.

With six weeks left before voting starts, South Africans need access to information they trust. That requires a sustained commitment to verification from political parties, institutions, media organisations, platforms and citizens.

By  ISS.